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A Tariff Primer
by Stanley J. Emerling*
N ATIONS HAVE ALWAYS ATTEMPTED to obtain the raw materials
and products of other lands in order to advance their own
economic prosperity. They have sought to achieve this economic
prosperity either by territorial expansion, peacefully or forcibly,
or by engaging in world trade. We shall concern ourselves here
only with the prospects of peaceful world trade.
Though it is an oversimplification to attribute the success
of nations to world trade alone, nevertheless, it plays an im-
portant part. Naturally ethnic and political considerations are
guide posts in ascertaining a policy of world trade. In addition,
two basic ingredients, namely, natural resources and the ability
to transform these resources into useable products, are of utmost
importance. It is these two factors that differentiate the "have"
from the "have not" nations of the world and which are part
and parcel of the argument supporting free trade based upon
the "law of comparative advantage." But before proceeding
further, it would be best at the outset to narrow the scope of
this article so as to exclude from consideration the problems of
national security, political pressures and special interest groups.
One of the considerations involved in the application of the
law of comparative advantage is the manner in which the natural
resources of the earth are distributed. Nations such as the
United States are fortunate that so much of the basic material
of production is available to its people within the geographical
boundaries of the country. Other countries similarly have the
same advantage.
Closely allied to natural resources is the manpower potential
of a nation, together with the mechanical ability to translate
ideas and material into a positive product. Actually these two
components do not always appear together as evidenced by the
staggering populations of such countries as China and India who
have little or no ability to translate their resources into pro-
ductive channels. It is this inherent ability to create and to in-
vent which has been a cornerstone of American economic suc-
cess.
* Mr. Emerling is in his 3rd year of study at Cleveland-Marshall, and is the
Assistant Editor of the Law Review.
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Comparative advantage in itself is not a complex doctrine.
Its mechanics are plausible, but its application creates many
difficulties. It is by no means a panacea for the solution of the
world's problems.
In the light of these considerations we may in a simplified
manner discuss the workings of the law of comparative advantage.
The basic premise upon which it operates is that the product
which one country is able to produce at a relatively less com-
parative cost than another country should be specialized in by
the former country until the costs of production of this item in the
two countries is equalized. Provided however that the latter
country is able to produce some other product which bears this
same relation to the former country. Thus, for example, in
ascertaining what product should be specialized in an assumed
trade situation between the United States and Brazil involving
automobiles and coffee, it is evident that the relative effort of
production for automobiles in the United States is less than in
Brazil, while the relative effort to produce coffee is less for Brazil
than for the United States. Consequently the United States
should increase automobile production by transferring resources
from coffee production, and Brazil the reverse until the relative
cost ratios between the countries becomes equal. It is imme-
diately apparent that such a balancing of world potential along
these lines raises many problems. Among these are the dis-
tances involved in transportation, the great number of nations
that a country such as the United States may be trading with,
the need of countries for critical goods for self-defense and the
great population migrations that might be caused within any
nation in order to make such a system operate. In an idealistic
situation of a unified global society, a free trade concept, un-
bridled by nationalistic tendencies or prejudices and without
regard for state boundaries, would be able to follow a more or
less absolute application of the doctrine of comparative ad-
vantage. But as with all other theoretical schemes, certain
definite realities must be faced, as well as a realization that in
many respects due to ethnic differences as well as cultural levels
that a certain conflict with present living standards, educational
progress and cultural attachment in any given nation would be
bound to exist. It is with these realities and conflicts of principle
and custom that we come face to face with the necessity of
regulating the flow of trade in order to reflect best the interests
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of the several nations. In this respect a discussion of the tariff
regulations of the United States and their applications at law
is appropriate.
But before proceeding into such a discussion it is imperative'
to consider some of the aspects and needs of a regulatory trade
policy. One of the primary arguments in support of a tariff
program is the need to protect infant industries. Though this
form of tariff is still applicable even today when a country may
first start to produce a product which it had formerly only
bought from some other nation, it is essentially only practically
applied to the new industries in relatively new nations. The
logic of a tariff which encourages the advancement of new in-
dustries and which attempts to aid their development by keeping
the price of the same type of foreign made article at a higher
price so that the citizens will buy the "home made" product in
preference to the foreign, is easily defended on several grounds.
The product may be one of extreme importance in establishing
the economic soundness of the nation so that a diversity of prod-
ucts may be attained. It may be one which is critical to the self-
sufficiency of the nation in the event of international disturb-
ances.
On the other hand, no matter how valid the argument may
be in the beginning for a tariff to encourage infant industries,
there comes a time when these protected industries are no longer
infant and may well in fact be the titans in their fields. So at
this point, the proponents of tariffs must use an entirely new
rationale in order to continue this favorable policy. Now, the
protection of home industry becomes their battle cry. It is argued
that home industries need protection from unfair competition
from foreign producers who desire to undersell them in order to
destroy them. Or, as in the case of the products such as perfume,
wines or watches, where foreign producers of these articles
either have the technical or geographical advantage over the
United States in the production of these items, it would not be
improbable that American citizens would prefer to purchase
them from France or Switzerland in preference to the American
product. Thereupon the American producers would be sure to
suffer and possibly, depending naturally on the product, its wide-
spread use, and degree of excellence over the American article,
be forced to discontinue their manufacture of these things.
Hand in glove with this idea is the corollary that tariffs are
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necessary in order to protect the living standards of the American
worker. It is an irrefutable fact that the American standard of
living is the highest found anywhere in the world. Statistics as
to the number of automobiles, telephones, television sets, and
bathtubs will bear this out. Consequently, in order to protect
this standard of living it is necessary to apply tariffs to products
produced in low cost labor areas. This argument has considerable
merit.
A more subtle refinement of this same problem is the equal-
ize-the-cost-of-production argument. It says that the tariffs
should reflect a variable factor which would equalize all the in-
dividual costs such as manpower, overhead, and methods. In
this manner the cost picture would be the same for an article
of similar description produced in a foreign country or the United
States. Undoubtedly a policy of this nature would be applied
to those countries situated at such a distance from the United
States as to make shipping charges a prohibitive factor in profit-
able trade.
Another major argument is the necessity of protecting and
promoting home industries which are vital to the self sufficiency
and self defense of the nation. Needless to say, this is a vital and
impregnable argument and as an instrument of foreign policy
and common sense no more need be said.
Though admittedly some arguments support the tariff ques-
tion merely on a revenue basis, as was the purpose in the begin-
ning, it has become much more than that, and revenue has ceased
to be an important factor. No one will dispute the important
place a tariff policy may play in foreign affairs as we have made
use of it with our possessions and territories as well as with
foreign countries under the Reciprocal Trade agreements. A
cursory examination of the aims of a tariff policy leads unde-
niably to the conclusion that as a short term project much may
be said in its support. On the broader issue of an intelligent long
term policy these advantages tend to disappear. Both the tariff
and the application of comparative advantage are so closely allied
that the solution to one might well be the solution to the other.
As with any other system of regulation, domestic or foreign,
there must be a basis in law upon which it is formulated. And
this is as true of tariff policy as any other. The authority for the
regulation of foreign commerce in the United States is found in
the Constitution in Article I, Section 8.
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Clause 1. The Congress shall have Power to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States;
Clause 3. To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
In Gibbons v. Ogden' Chief Justice Marshall said of the com-
merce clause: "The Constitution informs us, to commerce 'with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the In-
dian tribes.' It has, we believe, been universally admitted that
these words comprehend intercourse between the United States
and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between
this country and any other to which this power does not extend."
Later in another case further words from the Supreme Court
were uttered to show that the regulation of commerce was a
necessity in order to insure the safety of the United States from
any source. In the Marigold2 case it was said: "Congress are,
by the Constitution, vested with the power to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations; and however, at periods of high ex-
citement, an application of the terms 'to regulate commerce' such
as would embrace absolute prohibitions may have been ques-
tioned, yet, since the passage of the embargo and non-intercourse
laws, and the repeated judicial sanctions those statutes have re-
ceived, it can scarcely, at this day, be open to doubt, that every
subject falling within the legitimate sphere of commercial regula-
tion may be partially or wholly excluded, when either measure
should be demanded by the safety or by the important interests
of the entire nation. Such exclusion cannot be limited to par-
ticular classes or descriptions of commercial subjects; it may
embrace manufactures, bullion, corn, or any other thing. The
power, once conceded, it may operate on any and every subject
of commerce to which the legislative discretion may apply it.'
The Supreme Court later gave an answer to the antagonists
of a protective trade policy in the J. W. Hampton Co.3 case in
which the court went into the legality and the right to establish
a flexible tariff scale: "It is contended that the only power of
Congress in the levying of customs duties is to create revenue
1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
2 U. S. v. Peter Marigold, 9 Howard 566.
s J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Company v. U. S., 276 U. S. 394.
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that it is unconstitutional to frame the customs duties with any
other view than that of revenue raising. It undoubtedly is true
that during the political life of this country there has been much
discussion between parties as to the wisdom of the policy of pro-
tection, and we may go further and say as to its constitutionality,
but no historian, whatever his view of the wisdom of the policy
of protection, would contend that Congress since the first Rev-
enue Act in 1789 has not assumed that it was within its power
in making provision for the collection of revenue to put taxes
upon importations and to vary the subjects of such taxes or rates
in an effort to encourage the growth of the industries of the na-
tion by protecting home production against foreign competition.
It is enough to point out that the second act adopted by the Con-
gress of the United States, July 4, 1789 (chap. 2, 1 Stat. at L. 24)
contained the following recital:
"Sec. 1. Whereas it is necessary for the support of govern-
ment, for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and
the encouragement and protection of manufactures, that
duties be laid on goods, wares and merchandises imported:
Be it enacted, etc."
In this first Congress sat many members of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787. This court has repeatedly laid down the
principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the
Convention of 1787. This court has repeatedly laid down the
of our Constitution were actually participating in public affairs,
long acquiesced in, fixes the construction to be given its provi-
sions. (Myers v. U. S., 272 U. S. 52, 175, 71 L. Ed. 160, 190, 47
Sup. Ct. Rep. 21, and cases cited.) The enactment and enforce-
ment of a number of custom revenue laws drawn with a motive
of maintaining a system of protection since the Revenue Law
of 1789 on matters of history. * * * Whatever we may think of
the wisdom of a protection policy, we can not hold it uncon-
stitutional. So long as the motive of Congress and the effect of
its legislative action are to secure revenue for the benefit of the
general government, the existence of other motives in the selec-
tion of the subjects of taxes cannot invalidate congressional
action * * * and so here the fact that Congress declares that one
of its motives in fixing the rates of duty is so to fix them that
they shall encourage the industries of this country in the com-
petition with producers in other countries in the sale of goods
in this country, cannot invalidate a revenue act so framed."
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Later on in an attack on the legality of the Tariff Act of
1922 by the Trustees of the University of Illinois, 4 the Court went
into the aspects of taxation and the authority of Congress to
regulate commerce and came to a conclusion that Congress may
entirely prohibit any such commerce and that no state may over-
ride such action. It was said that this tariff act was to encourage
the industries of the United States, and further stated: "The
laying of duties is 'a common means of executing the power' 2
Story Const. S1088. It has not been questioned that this power
may be exerted by laying duties 'to countervail the regulations
and restrictions of foreign nations.' Id. p. 1087. And the Con-
gress may, and undoubtedly does, in its tariff legislation consider
the condition of foreign trade in all its aspects and effects."
It is evident from the examination of these cases that the
proponents of a tariff policy are well supported by Constitutional
authority and logic depending on the time and necessity of the
situation. Economically also there are many instances in which
a reduction in or denial of tariff policy would be to the detriment
of our country. The only point worth taking in summary of this
complex problem is the fact that a mere permissive use of a tariff
doesn't necessarily mean that the country's best interests are
always served by a too rigid application of such measures. The
reciprocal trade agreements of the last decade or so are proof
of this. It might be well to end this paper with a quotation from
the Inman Steamship case5 which sums up the universal feeling
of a trade restriction policy: "The commerce clauses of the Con-
stitution had their origin in a wise and salutary policy. They
give to Congress the entire control of the foreign and interstate
commerce of the country. They were intended to secure har-
mony and uniformity in the regulations by which they should
be governed. Wherever such commerce goes, the power of the
nation accompanies it, ready and competent, as far as possible,
to promote its prosperity and redress the wrongs and evils to
which it may be subjected."
4 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. United States of America,
289 U. S. 48.
5 The Inman Steamship Co. v. Edward C. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238.
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